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INTERCOMPANY COMPARISONS
An examination of the differences in top executive compensation policy
among the corporationsincluded in the sample rounds out the analysis.
Is there a systematic relationship between the size of afirm and the
rewards enjoyed by its senior executives? If so, which measure of size
seems to be the most reliablepredictor of compensation levels? Do
large firms make more use of deferred and contingentforms of reward
than small ones? Answers to such questions should serve tohighlight at
least some of the factors which have contributed tothe generation of
the collective experience described above.
Focus
Although data were not available on all five highestpaidexecutives in
every one of the fifty companiesstudied in every year, this was not a
significant problem when dealing with the aggregatecompensation
figures. There were enough observations at eachexecutive level in each
year to permit meaningful averages tobe obtained. The regularity and
consistency of the observed trends in remunerationwithin all five posi-
tions supports that contention. If the samplecorporations are con-
sidered individually, however, gaps in the data dobecome an issue,
since it is obviously inappropriate to attempt to comparethe compensa-
tion of one firm's top five executives with thatof the same group in a
second firm, if for either or both companies arecord for all five can-
not be developed for the year towhich the comparison is to apply.
Even though it was possible to providedata for 5,300 of the 6,000
man-years of remuneration experiencethat would comprise a complete
sample between 1940 and 1963, theremaining 700 turn out to be
widely distributed among the companiesstudied. As a consequence, a
good many of the fifty would have to beexcluded from consideration in
227r
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certainearsifthe coinpeilsation diflcrcncestntone thCttj Were
:unincd in terms ot aP five top exc'eiitivc positions1 lit the
the comparisons here will concentrate cu the remuneration of only the
highest-paid itidi'idua! in each firm. This will permit the maximum
number of conipanies to contribute data to those Comparisons. but
will not, importantly, mean that we svill sacrifice much in the was' of the
reliability of the results obtained. The anlount and the form of there-
wards of a corporation's top executive are, in fact, a (lependablc guide
to the experience of his colleagues in relation to executives in other
firms.
For example, for thirty-nine corporations in the sample, information
on all five top executive positions is available for 1940. If these firms
are ranked first according to the total amount of after-tax COlIlpeIlsation
received by their highest-paid executive alone and then by the amount
received by alt five together. the Spearman rank correlation Coefljcient
() between the two schedules turns out to he 0.934 and iseasily
significant at the .0001 level.2 A similar conclusion applies to anysear
we might care to consider:
a The 1963 computations arc based on a comparison of rankings by(I)
lop executive total compensation and (2) total eompenahon of the topthree,
since ihere are only six firms in that year for which dataon allfive positions
could be compiled.
For all practical purposes, therefore, the remuneration of thetop
executive in each firm should be a suitableproxy for the circumstances
of his four closest subordinates. As such, it providesa convenient and
efficient vehicle for the intercorporate analysis which is ofconcern here.3
This. parenthetically,isan advertisement forthe random nature of the
missing data.
Using a one-tailed "t" test for significance.
A case could also he made for itie proposjiion that,in any event, the ex-
perience of Just the lop executive is the mostappropi iate focus for such corn-
1940 0.934 39 4.129 15.890
1945 0.916 43 4.085 14.631
1950 0.922 45 4.067 15.571
1955 0.959 35 4.185 19.465
1963 0.971 25 4.415 19.470
Sample Critical 't"
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('ompeii.catioii aiul ('onpanv Cluiracierj.vttcs: Distributions
A eutnJ)iriOi1 of lhitti ihuts ul the firms iii the sample with the re-
muneratioll enjoyed by their respective top executives indicates that
there is a much greater degree of variation in characteristics among the
companies themselves than there is in the amount of Compensation the
provide for their senior officers. This conclusion holds not only for the
current structure of matiagerial rewards hut for that which existed prior
to World War 11 as well. Consider the following:
A, FOR1940:
B. FOR1963:
parisons because thereislittle questionasto differences in the nature or scope of
his job from one firm to the next. Problemsofconsistent job definition can





Company assets $l.583.t) $1,615.0 1.020
Company sales 1,910.5 2,337.9 1.223
Before-taxprofits 248.5 495.1 1.992
After-taxprofits 137.0 244.9 1.787
Equity market value 2,366.1 3,850.0 1.627
Top executive's before-
tax salary and bonus 210 82 0.391
Top executive's total





Company assets $330.0 $351.0 1.064
Company sales 254.7 298.7 1.173
Before-tax profits 32.6 50.5 1.549
After-taxprofits 22,1) 31.8 1.445
Equity market value 243.7 383.8 1.574
Top executive's before-
tax salary and bonus 137 95 0.693
Top executive's total
after-tax compensation 102 80 0,7870
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The figures pertaining to conipany characteristics areinniiliios of
doilars, while those which i_,fcr 11pc11s111u11 ' USands. Data
from forty-nine Companies are included in the calculat tons for 1940and
from forty-six companies for 1963these being the number offirms
out of the fifty studied for which full information about the remuneration
of their top executive was available in those years.4
The significant column in the tabulations is that which recordsthe
ratio of the standard deviation of each distribution to itsmean__the
so-called "coefficient of Variation." This parameter isa dimensionless
index which measures the degree of dispersion of each item aboutits
average value and thus provides a common basis for a comparison of
variations in quantities which have quite ditTerent original dimension5
It is apparent from these calculations that both at the beginning andat
the end of the time period covered there was a much wider diversityof
characteristics among the corporations examined than therewas in their
compensation policies, at least at the top of the organization. If thereis
a secular trend in the figures. it seems to be in the direction of rein-
forcing this phenomenon. The coefficient of variation of all hutone of
the features of the companies in the sample increased between 1940and
1963, while the corresponding values for their salary and totalcom-
pensation awards decreased.
A second noteworthy attribute of the data is the fact that thedis-
persion of the distribution of total after-tax compensation isconsider-
ably greater than that of the distribution of salary and bonuspayments.
This situation, of course, is a result of the impact ofa wider range of
factors on the value of the various deferred andcontingent rewards en-
joyed by executives than are relevant to theirsalaries and bonuses. In
1It should be noted that there isno reason to suspect that in this or any
subsequent discussions a biasis introduced because several firms are etciuded
from the comparisons for lackofdata. The inadequacy of some of the prosy
statement informationisnot peculiar to any particular category or size of firm.
The fact that we are unable inevery case to include all fifty corporations in the
analysisshould therefore he ofnomore concern thanif the original sample
implyconsistedoffewer firms to begin with.
After-tax salary and bonus datawere not included in the tabulations be-
cause the degree of variationin thosefigure.sispredictable from the given
before-tax distribution,i.e.,a progressive income tax schedule guarantees that
the coefficient of variation of after-taxcurrent remuneration will necessarily he
less than that of its pretaxcounterpart. The contrast with the several company
characteristics would therefore heeven more marked on that basis.INTERCOMPANY COMPARISONS 231
addition to those parameters of company compensation policy and posi-
tion attained which determine the amount of an individual's current
remuneration each year, hisaggregate earnings depend also on his
age. his previous experience under whatever noncurrent compensation
arrangements he enjoys, the market's most recent appraisal of the value
of his firm's common stock, and his skill or good fortune in taking ad-
vantage of any stock option grants. It is reasonable to expect, therefore,
that this aggregate would differ more substantially among executives
than would the direct cash payments they enjoy. Because supplements to
salary and bonus have become relatively more important over the years,
it is also not surprising to flnd that the difference between the degree of
dispersion in the total pay package and in current remuneration has
widened since 1940. In that year the coefficient of variation for before-
tax salary and bonus was 0.693 and for total compensation 0.787. In
1963 the figures were 0.394 and 0.768, respcctively.
Compensation Growl/i Rates
The rates of growth in the remuneration associated with the senior
executive positions in the companies studied varied extensively around
the average rate for the sample as a whole. The distribution of the
relevant compound annual rates between 1940 and 1963 for the forty-
five companies for which compensation data in both years were avail-
able is recorded in Table 30 and in Chart 26. Those observations may
be summarized as follows:
Standard Deviation
Mean of Distribution of
Growth Rate Growth Rates
(per cent) (per cent)
Again, if after-tax salary and bonus were included in the comparisons,the
contrast and its trend over time would be sharper still.
The numerical designation of the individual firms in the table does not cor-
respond to their alphabetic order as listed in Appendix I. Themissing numbers
denote the five companies for which either or both the 1940and 1963 top-
executive compensation figures could not he obtained.
Before-tax salary and bonus 2.6 2.0
After-tax salary and bonus 0.1 I .4
Total after-tax compensation 2.7 2.90
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The mean values thus computed differlightk' from those determined
in Chapter 8 because in this case each companvs rate of growth is
weighted equally, while earlier the weights were based on the absolute
afliOIIflt of compensation paidbyeach firm.
It is obvious both from thissummaryand from Chart 26 that execu-
tives had quite different experiences depending on the company they
worked for. Particularly strikiniis the fact that in seven instances the
total after-tax compensation received b' the senior officer in the firm
actually Was .mailer in 1963 than it was in1 940. i.e.. the observed rate
of growth is negative. The same is true of I)ctorc-tax salary and bonus iii
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five firms and of its after-tax counterpartin fully sixteen firmsovcr
one-third of the indicated sample. It is worthnoting, however, that while
such situations certainly contribute to a poorcollective historical per-
formance of remuneration comparedwith the ratcs of growth of the
employer companies, they do not by any meansdominate or distort
that comparison by affecting the aggregatefigures disproportionately.
In only one of the forty-five instancestabulated dd all three measures
of the compensation enjoyed by the topexecutive of a firm grow more
rapidly than even the slowest-growingof the five indexes of the size of
the firm itself. In two instances, twoof the compensation measuresS
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grew more rapidly, and in four cases. oneof them (lidü.Thus, for all
hut a small minority of companies inthe sCuiiple, the aSsertionsmade
in Chapters 8 and 9 on the basis ofthe aggregate data are uncondi
tionallyvalid, and even for that minority the evidence is mixed,'
As judged by the standard deviationsof the several distributionsthe
dispersion of the relevant growth ratesis greatest in the case of total
after-tax compensation and least forafter-tax salaryitid bonus. That
pattern is, of Course, consistentwith the "dampening" influence ofa
progressive tax structure on after-tax salary variations and with the fact
that a broader range of factors has an impact on executives' total com-
pensation than on their salaries and bonuses.
Groiu'th Rate Coin parisons: Salary t's. Total Coin peflsa(jop,
Given the collection of data in Table 30 and the opportunity to compile
similar tabulations for other intervals of time, it is possible to determine
the extent to which differences among firms in the rates of growth of
the most visible indexes of the rewards enjoyedbytheir senior officers
their salary and bonus receiptsarc reliable indicators of differences
among them with respect to rates of growth of aggregate remuneration
as well.
A convenient way to examine this issue is providedbythe rank cor-
relation technique referred to above. If the corporations in the sample
arc ranked according to the rate of growth of their highest-paid execu-
tive's salary and bonus and according to the rate of growth of the same
individual's total compensation, the degree of correspondence between
the two schedules can be appraised by means of the Spearman rank
correlation coefficient, p. where:
SIndividual comparisons of the same sort are notpossibleinrelatingin-
creases over time in executives' rewards to the rate of growth of the incomes of
other professional groups, since collective dati concerning the latterisalt that
isavailable hereHowever, itcan he seen from Table30thattheuzgregate
after-tax remuneration associated with the top executive position in thirty-seven
of the forty-five fIrms grew moreslowlybetween1940and1963than the ).
per cent per annum figure observed for physicians and dentists.In twenty-six
of the forty-five cases. agoregate remuneration grew moreslowlythan the3.9
per cent per annum increase experienced hlawyers. It seems fair to conclude
then, that in these comparisons as well the aggreg:tte resultsapplyalso to the





d refers to the difference betweenthe two rankings assigned to firm i
under the respective criteria, and ii denotes the numberof firms in the
sample. This coefficient is designed in such a mannerthat when the two
sets of rankings are identical, phas a value of plus 1; when one ranking
is exactly the reverse of theother, p becomes minus 1. The possibility
that the indicated degree ofcorrespondence could have arisen by chance
may be tested, forsituations in which n10. by calculating Student's
"t," where in this context:
In _2']½
t = p1LI - p
with n -- 2 degrees of freedom. A value for tgreater than that associated
with whatever level of confidence ischosen implies that the extent of
the agreement between the two schedulessuggested by p is significant at
that leve1.
The concern at the moment, then, iswhether the firms in the sample
which have awarded their top executivesthe most substantial increases
in salary and bonus over time havedisplayed the same sort of leadership
with regard to total compensation. In thatconnection, rates of growth
during the postwar years seem as relevant asthose covering the full
period 1940 to 1963. As wasindicated in Chapter 8, virtually all the
observed appreciation in the several itemstabulated occurred within the
ten years subsequent to 1945.Therefore, the degree of correspondence
between the rankings was examinedfor the intervals 1945 to1955 and
1945 to 1963 as well. The results areshown in the tabulations on page
236. The difference in the correlationcoefficients calculated fortile
before-tax and after-tax salary andbonus comparisons is. of course,
accounted for by the differential inipactof progressive income taxes on
after-tax rates of growth.11'
For a complete discussion, see SidneySiegel. NonparoPfletric Sfitis1ic'S for
(he Behor,oral .S'cie,ues, New York. 1956. pp.202-2 13.
'The problem of ticsinthe various rankings.which woId necessitate a
slight modification of the rankcorrelation computations. does notarise here.
It turned out to he possible in almost everyinstance to resolve anapparent
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As is evident, the data suggest at best onl' aerloose connection
over the time periods considered, especially from 1945 on. \Vhile two
of the coefficients obtained are signihcant at the .01 level, they are still
not ieailv large ettougli to generate rime]'Coiltide iice on the part of an
observer that a rapid rate of growth in the level of salary and bonus
awarded the top executive in a particular firm 1)ro\ides a good basis for
assuming that the aggregate value of the compensation package asso-
ciated with that position will have grown in like manner.
It couki happen. however, that some peculiar feature of a single year's
equivalence between two or more of Lhc observed r;utes of growthsimply by
currying out the calculations to a greater nuiniher of siin,licant digits.In those
few cases in which the growth rate'. acre precisely the s.umee.g.. a sitcattott
wherein sularv and bonus exactly doubted inIssoditfetent firmsthe ticsuas
broken hdetermining which of the tss o displayed the greater growth rate in
payments toalllivesenior e\eetlt yeposit ions conibi tied.Ihtis.one of the
r,utionales for the ;tppropriatencss of cun!in i no thei ruterconipa fly eorirp:urisons to
only the highest-paid e\eduti\e in each lionusarncariof incluiitun uman
of the 1ift' companies in the sampleuspssihle iii those .sniparustins svathat the
ress urds enjosed by such individualsss CrC 1servuiotid index of therelative
itiegnittide of the rewards received by theii initnediate suuboRhinates.Itisthcie
fore consistent with the nature of our interestthatthe experience of losuei-
ranking executives he used to e'tablish 1difference bets; cellLwo tirms when that
difference ustot apparent at the too of the org;sniiutiori atone.
1940-63 45 0.433 3.149 2.416
1945--55 5(1 0.284 3053 2.41)6
1945-63 46 0.183 1.237 2.414
1 940-63 45 0.428 3.104 4l 6
1945-55 50 0.264 I .90) 2.106
1945--63 46 0.164 1.102 2.414
(riticjil
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dataextraordinary stock option profits realized bya few in(lividuals,
for exuniple--- might distort the growth rate figures on which the analysis
jhaced aiit! lead to an overly pesimistic apprai;a1 of the degreeof
agreement between the several schedules. Such Situations, if they exist,
are most likely to OCCUF in the later years of the study when, as we have
seen, the volatility 01' executives' rewards increased substantially. Any
adjustment of the data to eliminate possible problems of this sort should
therefore focus on those years. Accordingly, the rates of growth be-
tween 1940 and 1963 and between 1945 and1 963 were recalculated,
substituting for the original1 963 figures the average values for each
item over the years 1960 through 1963. The new set of rankings gen-
erated did not, 1toweer, improve the correlation results. Thus:
A. ul:IORE-rAx SAlARY AND UDNUs VS. TOTAL
Af FR-TAX (ONII'ENSATION GROWThRATES:
Critical
Interval n p Computed tat .01 l.evel
1940 to 1960/63 44 .449 3.257 2.418
1945 to 1960/63 45 .209 1.401 2.416
Is. AFE ER-TAN SALARY ANt) IIONUS VS. TOTAL
AFTI R-TAX (OM !'ENST!ON GROWTH RATFS
Critical
Interval n p Coniputed tat .01 Level
1940 to 1960/63 44 .363 2.525 2.418
1945 to 1960/63 45 .134 0.887 2.416
The number of companies whichan he included in the analysis is smaller
in this case because we now require that compensation data he availablein
each of four years at the end of the relevant interval instead of just one.
Indeed, the various schedules seem to be rather less in agreement than
before. The intervals which begin with 1940 still provide the better
basis of comparison, hut none of the relationships appear to be very
strong.
The conclusion this suggests, then. is that increases in deferred and
contingent rewards dominate the compensation policy differences among
firms over time. Historical patterns of salary and bonus payments are//
not only in the aggregate poor iitt 'xes)f the rate ol ero th inthe totti
remuneration received by se!iior corporate executives-. ('hipter
i
made clear-hut are also unreliable as guides to relati\ e erovtjirtt
in intl ividua I coiliptn los.
Salary i's. Total Cwnpensa!ion: A hvoluie Leve/c
A substantially better set of results is obtained from an examination of
the absolute level of rewards. In etCII ol six Separateears spannjt
the time period under consideration, and on the basis of theannua'
averages computed for live different suhperiods within that i!1tervi1th
corporations in the sample were ranked according to theInlount of
salary and bonus paid their Senior otlicers and according to the size of
the same individuals' total pay package.I he extent of theagreetj
between the schedules derived was then tested as above, with the follow-
ing outcome:
SALARY ANt) ttONUS VS. TOTAL CON1l'EN sArtoN RANKINGS
Critical
Year n p Coniputed tat .01 Level
All the indicated coefljcientsare sigriifjcant---most of them by a com-
fortable margin.12
In this case. it was not neccssar'to contpule two different sek of rankings
for before- and after-tax salaryand bonus, since on in absolute level scale. an
executive will enjoy the same relative standingin the sample by eithcr criterion.
I 2 Except for thatassociated with the sear 1;55, they arc significant ecn at
the .001level.
1940 49 .793 8.916 2.408
1945 50 .433 3.327 2.406
1950 50 .599 5.186 2.41)6
1955 50 .343 2.533 2.406
1960 50 .588 5.038 2.406
1963 46 .625 5.308 2.414
1940-49 Average 49 .752 7.812 2.408
1951-55 Average 50 .455 3.540 2.406
1956-60 Average 50 .527 4.295 2.406
1955-63 Average 45 .594 4.840 2.416
1960-63 Average 45 .617 5.134 2.116
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Company Growth and Co,npensationGro%t'th
If, then, for many of the companies in the presentsample, the policies
which determine the direct current remuneration ofthe senior executive
of the firm seem to create a ratherdifferent pattern of rewards than
those which establish the amount of his aggregateremuneration, the
next logical question is whether there mayexist some systematic rela-
tionship between either of these items andthe observable characteristics
13 By, for example, the shareholders of a firmwho were interestedinap-
praising its executive compensation policy relative toother firms.
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The pattern of the results, especially as summarized by the correla-
tion coefficients for the five period-average rankings, is in accord with
what one might expect from the compensation history outlined in the
preceding chapters. The two schedules being compared correspond quite
closely during the early years of the study when, of course, salary and
bonus comprised the bulk of the executive pay package. This relation-
ship drops off considerably in the interval 1951 through 1955 in re-
sponse to the first really heavy use by corporations of the newer forms
of deferred and Contingent compensation. Thereafter, as firms' experi-
ence with such arrangements accumulates, as their employmentbecomes
more widespread and systematic, and as the oftensharp initial impact
on certain individual executives' rewards starts to leveloff, the rankings
begin steadily, if slowly, to converge again. By the early 1960's, the two
schedules are in substantially greater agreement than they were ten
years earlier.
Despite this improvement, however, a corporation's salary and bonus
scale has not for some time been a truly satisfactory index of its over-
all compensation policy vis-à-vis other firms. Correlationcoefficients
on the order of .4 to .6 do not,after all, imply a very close relationship.
Accordingly, while these results are markedly better than those gen-
erated by a comparison of rates of growth they still fail short ofyielding
a value for of, say, .9 orhigherwhich, in the view here, would sug-
gest that the salary and bonus and totalcompensation rankings are
in fact sufficiently alike that the former couldconfidently be used as a
proxy for the latter.'3 Anyempirical study which, either explicitly or
implicitly, treats the two as interchangeable should thereforebe suspect.r I
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of the individual company. ('onsider this question first in terms of ecu-
far changes in the relevant qu:nt!tie¼Pb lb.' m.i rapd!'rov'irlg ccr-
porations also provide their top executives with the most rapid Increases
in compensation?
For this purpose. the linusin the Sample were ranked according
to their respective rates of growth in each of the five dimensiops of
company size tabulated earlier:assets, sales, before-tax profits, after.
tax profits, and the total market value of their common stock. That Set of
rankingsand corresponding ones for the rates of growth in top-execu_
tive before-tax salary and bonus, after-tax salary and bonus, and total
after-tax compensation--were constructed for theintervalsI 94() to
1963. 1945 to 1955, and 1945 to 1963. Once again. iii order to e-j.
nate any possible problems with unusual compensation data for a single
year. separate rankings obtained by substituting for theI 963 figures the
pertinent 1960 throughI 963 averages were also compiled. The rank
correlation coefficients between the schedules for each of the three meas-
ures of growth in compensation and those for each of the five indexes
of company growth were then calculated. The results are recorded in
Table 31 (see page 242).
As was true of the compariSuhls above, the paired rankings agree least
over the period 1945 to 1955. Indeed, in two instances the correlation
coefilcients, even though not significant, turn out to he negative. suggest-
ing that during these years the more vigOrotts the firm's expansion, the
slower its senior officer's remuneration increased. Perhaps the most
plausible explanation for such poor results can he found simply in the
chronology of postwar compensation policy developments. It was at
about this time that corporations began to take advantage of those
deferred and contingent rewards whose value to the individual executive
is particularly dependent not only upon his personal circumstances-
e.g., his agewhen they are initiated hut also upon what were then
rather rapidly changing stock market conditions. Since experience with
these devices had not vet stabilized, it isnot unusual that we observe an
erratic pattern among firms in the lateI 94O's and early1 950's. What-
ever permanent relationships may exist betweencompany characteristics
and executive rewards are unlikelyto be reflected very accurately in the
data for this period.
On the other hand, thereseems to he only scattered evidence of suchINT1RCOMPANY (05IPAR1SONS 241
a relatnJflship eveniiitrR)Se Comparisons which are concerned with
rates of growth over what should be more suitable intervals of time.
'lhc remaining coefficients recorded display the "correct' sign, but
just twelve of the sixty ate significant at the .01 level. Averaging the
data over several ycaN again does not materially improve the compari-
SonS.In the majority of cases, in fact, it reduces both the magnitude and
the significance of the resulting coefficients. Apparently, an' peculiarities
that may be present in a particular year are not severe enough to re-
quire adjustrnentor, perhaps more accurately. are not peculiarities
at all.
The only generalizations worth attempting would seem to be the fol-
lowing:
The tolal compensation growth rankings correspond somewhat
more close!y to those of company growth rates thando either of the
salary and bonus schedules.Of the twelve correlation coefficients
which are significant, eight arc in the total compensation column.
2. All three indexes of compensation growth appear linked more to
the rate of growth of a company's sales than to the other measures of
its performance over time. In particular. a comparison withsales in-
creases provides better results in ever'period than with the most fre-
quently proposed alternative "explanatory" variable--company profits.
Even these conclusions, however, rest on fairly weakevidence, since
the computations indicate at best only a very mild correspondencebe-
tween the various rankings.
Conipanv Size and Ccnnnensatioz Levels
The story in terms of absolute magnitudes is ratherdifferent, as Table 32
records. Virtually every coefficient of correlationbetween the several
measures of a company's size and itssenior officer's rewards in a given
year or term of years is significant atthe .01 levelJIn the case of
the salary and bonus comparisons there is not asingle exceptionall
IExceptions occur primarily among the suspect1945-to- 1955 comparisonS.
As was noted previously, the Iefore-tax andafter-tax salary and bonus
rankings are identical at a ptnnt in time, md it is not necessaryto develop isso



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































244 EXECUTIVE COM PENSATION
I.\l(! 132
lop Executive Compensation vs. Empk)yer Company Site:
Rank Correlation Results
(on elation ( oireliitioii
ss ith Salars tith 1 otal
('onipanv alit! Itoruis ( onipelisationSample (
Year ('haractei----------------------Sue t at .01
or Penod istic I /1 1 fll l.esel
(()!IIiIIlIP(I)
:\ssCts .5294.278 .602 5.)65
Sales .626 507 .6425.7-t6
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but four of the coefficients being significant at the .001 level.6 It is, of
course, inevitable that if the compensation rankings are in reasonable
agreement with a schedule compiled on the basis of any one of the
characteristics of the corporations in the sample, they will be found
to agree with the schedules derived from each of the other four char-
15\Vhich requiresa valuefortin excess of about 3.30forsaniples of the
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acterisfies as well, since the hitter are tlieniselves high!v correJat
is therefore inappropriate in this context to attempt to single Outa par-
ticular item as the explanatory variable for compensation poIic.On
the other hand, we do have available a substantial body of data from
which it is possible to observe certain patterns. \Vithout stretchingthe
point too far,it should also be possible to suggest some concljoi
from those patterns which provide at least a start in the directjoflof
(leternhinitlg which of the attributes of the corporation seems the "best"
predictor of the remuneration of its senior officer.
One feature of the calculations, for example, is the fact that,except
in the year 1940, the degree of correspondence between the topexecu-
tive salary and bonus rankings and those for each of the fiveindexes
of company size is greater than between the latter and thesame in-
dividuals' total compensation.'T To the extent that theremay be a
causal relationship present, therefore, it seems to manifest itselfmore
in terms of the current remuneration profile than as a determinantof
over-all compensation levels.
A second, and complementary, phenomenon is the trendover time in
the salary and bonus rankings toward somewhat greateragreement with
the several company size schedules--reinforced bya similar shift in the
opposite direction by the total compensation figures. In 1963, fourof
the five salary and bonus coefficientswere higher than they were in
1940, but during the same interval, all five total compensationcoeffi-
cients declined. While there are departures from bothpatterns in the
intervening years. both appear valid in the longrun.
Also of particular interestare the consistently better results obtained
from a comparison of the two compensationmeasures with corporate
profit rankings than with sales figures. For salaryand bonus in ten of
the eleven situations considered, both thebefore-tax and after-tax profit
coefficients are greater than the salescoefficient, frequently by a wide
margin. The exception again is in 1940.but the sales coefficients de-
cline steadily thereafter. In thecase of total compensation. all eleven
pairs of profit coefficients exceed theirsales counterparts.Itis note-
worthy that during the mostrecent years studied, however, the best set
17It does not make much differenceeither to this Or sticcccdinconclusions whether we consider singleyears or averages over periods of yearsinthe
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of figures in connection with total compensation is provided by a coni-
parison of those data with the raiiking of firms according to the iitgre-
gate market value of their common stock. Clearly, this trend is a con-
sequence of the shift in emphasis within the pay package toward heavier
reliance on rewards whose value to the executive depends on the market
price behavior of his firm's shares.
Finally, the relationship between executive rewards and company
size seems to have been weakest in 1945. with 1955 not far behind.
Both outcomes can he explained by historical circumstances. In 1945
the effects of wartime restrictions on co'1pensation increases were still
being felt, even though the relative positions of the corporationsin the
sample in terms of sales, profits, assets, etc.. had changed considerably
because of wartime production. The problem inI 955. as we have seen,
was the major change in corporatecompensation policy which was
then in the process of being consolidated. Despite these temporary
discrepancies, however, it is clear that there is in general a strong con-
nection between the sizeofa firm and its top executive'sremuneration.
The data further suggest, although more equivocally,that company
profits are a somewhat better predictor of such payments.especially of
salary and bonus levels, than are sales.
Evaluation
Such an analysis. of course, is only a very limitedfirst step in this area,
and no more is claimed for it here than that.A truly comprehensive
appraisalofthe sourcesofdifferences among firms would have to in-
clude in a unified niultivariate regression formatthe influenceofa host
of factors which were ignored in the pairedordinal comparisons em-
ployed above. Among the more important of these arelikely to be:
Differences in the degree of risk associatedwith different lines of
business.
Differences in the degree of governmentalregulation of the firm's
activities.
Differences in the profit cycle in variousindustries)s
Thatis. ifan executive'sdecisionsatallypoint in time set in motion forces
whoseimpactonthe corporation's success are notfeltuntilnycor ten yearsS
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I)ilIereneesantoitg firms in the extent to which top managem
has an ownership interest iii the company.
l)ifIerences in the nature of the joh responsibilities of the ineat
the top of the organization.
t)ifferences in the collective bargaining enVironinent--anrl hence,
in the degree of concern with the oppearance of senior executi\'e Pas'
leveIN.
Taken together. these factors may very likely he as influe!ltial as em-
ployer company size and profitabilityiii determining the patternsof
remurleratR)n we observe. They must either be recognized or controlled
for in whatever model of the compensation process is constructed, if the
net effect of company size is to he properly appraised. Because such an
etlori would require the collection and interpretation of a substantial
body of evidence which is not central to the focus of the current study.
itwill not be undertaken here. The correlation results tabulateul on
the preceding pages suggest some rough qualitative conclusions, hut
are hardly adequate to the ol)jective indicated.'
Compo.vitw,iofthe PayPackage
Given information about the value of supplements to executive salaries
and bonuses, itis also possible to seek an answet to a question which
heretofore has been treated in only the most superficial manner: Is there
a relationship between the size of a firm and the extent to which it
in tlifuture, there is less reason for his lcmtincration to he linked to his firut's
current performance than in situation' where the pavoti is more rapid.
Aniong the attempts thus far made to "explain' executive conipensation
levels on thebasis of conipanv sizeand nrolitahiliivarcthose of Roberts
E ut olive (u!nfo'notiun.Gleneoc,III..959 )and MeG uire .('hiu, and Fihing
"Fxccutivincomes, Sale, and trotjts,".4 ,m'rjc'w: Lc000ntic Rciies.Septem-
ber.962,pp.753-761 ).In both cases, the phenomenonofa high degree of
correlation an long the possible independent variables in theregression equations
caused dilticuttiesin deciding upon the "best" predictor of compensation. A
nio e fuinditinental problem in connection with the usefulness of their analysis.
hoss Cs er,is that neil her effort (lea It withmv nicaso res of the rcniu ner;ition pro-
vided by deferred and contingent rewards, Onlyexecutive salaries and bonuses
sere consutered--mndas has been made clear here.thclatter constittiteless
thtn half the value of the relevant earnings.1NTERCOO PANY COMPARISONS 249
Lltflizcsdefert ed and CUntiflgL'Ilt compensation arrangements to reward
itexeeutive' A mere census of the relative popularity ofucli devices
among small and large lIrnisis of little use, since not just their exist-
ence but their benefit structures are ol concern. As it turns out, the
data suggest that the larger and niore profitable the firm, the more
heavily it does infact rely on supplemental Compensation. The evi-
dence is not overwhelming. however, and its interpretation is subject to
certain qualifications.
The raw data themselves are worth calling attention to. Table 33
records the percentages which salary and bonus provided of the aggre-
gate after-tax remuneration enjoyed. during the periods 1940 through
1949 and 1955 through 1963, by the men who were the highest-paid
executives in each of the fifty companies in the saniple. The two dis-
tributions are summarized in Chart 27. As can be seen, the percentages
in the earlier period var' from 40.9 to 100, with a mean of 75.6 and
a standard deviation of 16.9. The distributionis mildly bimodal, ob-
servations clustering both in the area of 55 to 65 and 90 to 100 per
cent. In recent years the figures run from as low as 13.7 up to82.5 per
cent. The mean of the latter distribution, which has apronounced mode
in the region of 35 to 45 per cent, is 44.4. and itsstandard deviation
16.4 per cent.
The policy differences among the firms depicted are thereforequite
substantial within both intervals, the dispersion beingslightly less in
absolute terms in the later period but considerably largerin relation to
the then-lower mean. In each case. the range of valuestabulated is suf-
ficient to make a comparison with company sizemeaningful. and the
fact that the data represent aggregate figures over twodecade-long in-
tervals, at opposite ends of the time during which mostfirms' compensa-
tion policies seemed to be in transition, should permit someconfidence
that the long-run objectives of those policies areaccurately characterized.
When the corporations listed are ranked accordingto the percentage
of total after-tax compensation whichsupplements to salary and bonus
provided for their executives during the twotime periods, and these
rankings are compared with those derived fromeach firm's average as-
sets, annual sales, etc., over the sameperiods, the following results are
obtained:
Ir
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Correlation with Relative
Importance of Supplenients
to Salary and Bonus
Index ot Critical
IntervalCompany Size () at .01 Level
Assets .395 2.9Sf)
Sales .222 1.561 2.408
1940-49Profits. h.t. .323 2.340 49)
Profits, a.). .356 2.612
Market value .275 1.962
Assets .263 1.788
Sales .133 (1.880 2.416
1955-63Profits. ht. .326 2.263 (..4S)
Profits. a.t. .314 2.171
Market value .351 2.460
While only three of the coeflicients are significant at the level indicated, I
all are comfortably positive, and it does appear likely that there is a
direct, if not %'ery strong, relationship present.
One feature of the comparisons which duplicates the pattern observed
in connection with absolute levels of remuneration is the evidence that
both measures of employer-company profits are better guides to the
composition of the pa package than are company sales. The differences
in the coefficients are quite sizeable in each of the two time periods con-
sidered. A second. and not unexpected, phenomenon is the improvement
over time in the performance of the market value of a firm's common
stock as a predictor of the extent to which it makes use of deferred and
contingent rewards. This trend, of course, is simply a reflection of the
fact that nowadays the value of many of those rewards depends directly
on stock price movements.
Our interpretation of these results, however, must he hedged. Even
if we believe that the degree of correspondence shown between tile se
eral sets of rankings implies causation somewhere along the line,it
could well be that the underlying stimulus isnot company size or
profitability per Se, hut another attribute of the lirm which happens to
be related to both. An example might be the possibility that the larger
tile corporation, the less likely is an individual executive to he among
its major shareholders. In order to counter that situation and encourageINTIRCo?1 PAN\' ('ONI PARISONS
1\I3t i.33
Salary and Bonus as a Per Cent of Total After-Tax Compensation.
by Company
a closer identification by him with shareholder interests, the large finn
may feel more impelled to include in its compensation package such in-
struments as stock options and profit-sharing plans through which a
substantial ownership position can be attained by the executive.








1940-49 1955-63 1940-49 1955-63
I 52.8 69.9 28 74.9 29.2
2 93.6 43.() 29 60.6 -
3 80.3 39.4 30 63.2 24.8
4 86.4 28.1 31 57.4 39.4
5 56.8 25.9 32 91.1 50.7
6 53.9 55.7 33 85.9 35.8
7 88.6 - 34 100.0
8 64.1 - 35 51.7 -
9 9l.5 45.5 36 79.0 82.5
10 62.5 74.2 37 94.8 57.2
Ii 60.7 41.6 38 100.0 19.2
12 74.1 50.5 39 64.9 27.2
13 100.0 66.7 40 97.6 40.5
14 100.0 - 41 94.0 43.2
IS 100.0 16.4 42 65.7 39.!
16 79.4 37.4 43 58.3 77.8
17 55.5 24.2 44 58.7 52.3
18 61.2 57.9 45 47.5 36.4
19 76.8 38.0 46 91.! 56.!
20 90.7 39.5 4.7 - 33.!
21 93.1 13.7 48 81.3 62.4
22 93.8 44.2 49 71.4 52.6
23 64.6 35.4 50 71.6 44.5
24 94.6 62.2
25 40.9 37.2 .i 75.6 44.4
26 58.4 37.2 16.9 16.4
27 70.1 77.0 .223 .37022 lxi ('i.IIVI('Orl I'l Ns\TtON
/)ici,jbiiljni)f Salar' au1 B('nu,s as a /'eP('enl(ll,'e af joint













more sophisticated in its compensation planning and more alert to the
desirabilityofthe various supplements which our tax laws have come
to sanction.' Whether this argument is as credible in the context of
a sample Consisting entirelyof'erv large coroorations OSit Would be
it' we were dealing with a broader range (ii company sizes iS. 01 course.
questionable.
The mechanics of certain aspectsofthe compensation process suggest
° See Appendix M for a related discussion.
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still a third explanation. If. as is usually the case, the formula for estab-
lishing the he!1cits due an executive under, say, his firm's penon hilan
is expressed in terms of his before-tax salary, the after-tax value of those
benefits will be more important to him in relation to after-tax salary at
successively higher salary levels. The same will he true of any supple-
mental compensation items that are awarded in proportion to current
remuneration but taxed at lower ratcs.' If, then, it turns out that top
executive salaries and bonuses are directly related to company size,
the proportion of total after-tax compensation supplied by deferred and
contingent rewards can be expected to follow suit, even though e\ery
firm in the sample might adopt similar benefitformulasfor those de-
vices. Clearly, every firm does not do so, and we find a much greater
degree of agreement between the salary and bonus and company size
rankings than between the latter and salary and bonus perccntages.-
To the extent that pensions and other supplemental pay plans do tend
to become standardized among firms, however, the patternindicated will
develop, arid it may explain at least part of the relationship we observe.2
'rite real issues in this connection may therefore involve a variety of
factors, only some of which are manifestations of intentionalpolicy de-
cisions by the firm. Whatever the cause, it does appear that therelative
importance of deferred and contingent rewards increases with com-
pany size and profitability, but thattendency also appears to be rather
mild.
The "Best" Predictor of Co,npensalion Levels
In examining the data for these rankings it becameevident that there is
one attribute of the firm which provides anextremely good basis for
' The number of shares granted under a stock option, for example. isoften
a function of the optionee's salary.
22 Diflerences in such factors as the ages of the executives involvedand the
manner in which they exercise their stock optionsalso give rise to variations in
the value of noncurrent rewards which arenot present in connection with
salaries.
23 Another possibility which should not he neglectedisthat cause-and-eflect
may run in just the opposite direction fromthat implied here. It might he argued
that those firms with high sales,profits, and equity market values enjoy that
statusbecausethey make extensive use of deferred andcontingent rewards of the
typewhosevalue to the executive depends on favorablestock market reaction to
management's decisions. Oflicials in such firms aretherefore given a particular
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predictingitsstatidininthe sample interms otthe areCate re-
niuneratmon enjoyed by mIs top cxecutiV'.I miloruinately. however,tlii
dbcovcry does not really help muchill un(lerstanding why thingsare
as they are, and for that reason the relationship Ol)SCrVeds more a
curiosity than a useful analytical tool. The item referred to is simi
the percentage of the total value of the firm's top executive cornpenca
tion package which is accounted for by supplements to salary and bonus.
A ranking of the corporations in the sample according to that percentage
for any given periodespecially recent onescorresponds almost ex-
actly to the schedule obtained by ranking theni in order of the absolute
magnitude of their senior officersaggregate remuneration. Consider
the following correlation results:
RANK BY SUPPLEMENTS TO SALARY AND BONUS AS A
(OMPENS.VliON PER CENT OF All. \'S. RINK BY SIZE
The importance of deferred and contingent arrangements is well illus-
trated by these comparisons. The firms that have the highest over-all pay
scales are precisely those which emphasize supplements to salary and
bonus most heavily. In fact, if one were going to ignore certain pay-
ments in a study of intercorporate patterns of managerial remuneration
he would be better advised to forget about salary and bonus and con-
centrate on the rest of the pay package rather than the reverse. While
intriguing, this conclusion of course leaves us somewhat short of being
able to explain or even predict why the firm chooses,or feels compelled.
to employ deferred and contingent rewards to the extent it does. We
can, in effect, now state with great confidence that corporations which
have provided their top officials with high levels of earnings have done
so almost entirely by means other than salary and bonus. but we still
are not in a position to rationalize that result.
OF TOTAL PAY i'ACKAGE
Critical
interval a 1' Computed t .01 Level.00001 Ievel
1940-49 49 .756 7.929 2.408 4.744
1951-55 So .893 13.726 2.406 4.733
1956-60 50 .889 13.422 2.406 4.733
1960-63 45 .963 23.557 2.416 4.793
1955-63 45 .932 16.809 2.416 4.793INTERCOMPANY COMPARISONS 255
Lxtrapoiating the R ecu its
As was indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the cross-sectional
comparisons we have been considering are basedon compensation data
which describe the experience of on!the highest-paid executive in each
of the corporations studied. The focus was so limited out ofa desire to
include in those comparisons as many of the fifty companies in the origi-
nal sample as possible. Given the necessity of operating under thatcon-
straint, the question arises as to whether the various patternswe observe
would have been duplicated had it been possible to extend the analysis
to the full five-man senior executive group from which the historical
profile recorded in previous chapters was drawn.
Some evidence to support an affirmative answer was cited above.
We saw that the correlation coefficients obtained by comparing the rank-
ing of the firms in the sample according to thc total after-tax compensa-
tionof their highest-paidofficialand according to that fortheir
five highest-paid together were on the order of .95 and significant at
the .000 Ilevel. A similar comparison of the other pertinent dimensions
of the pay package yields correspond!ngly high coefficients, as Table 34
records. In the great majority of cases it does seem that the experience
of a firm's top executive vis--vis that of his peers in other companies
is also a reliable indicator of the relative standing of his four closest
subordinates. It therefore seems likely that the conclusions suggested
here would have been changed very little if the analysis could have been
broadened to encompass the latter's rewards as well.
Sum mars'
An examination of the differences in top executive compensation policy
among the firms in the sample reveals that there exist within the com-
posite historical experience depicted earlier significant variationsin
the size and structure of the relevant pay packages. The magnitude of
these variations is, however, proportionately less than the range of size
and profitability exhibited by the firms themselvesa phenomenon which
appears to be growing stronger over time. As might be expected, there
is a greater dispersion in the distribution of executives' total compensa-
tion than in that of their salaries and bonuses.
I256 i:xl:L'I'lVI-ol i'iss'FioN
I'.111I'
('ompeilsation of I-I igliel- Paid I'.xecuti ye vs.( olilpensationci'live
1-I ighest Paid 'together:RanL ('orrelalions\CIOssF ii-ni
Note: Rankinas not LOT 'led through I 903 because of small sample si/C \ hich teuRs
A comparison on a company-by-company basis of the rate of growth
of executive rewards and the rate of growth ci corporate assets, sales,
profits, and common stock market values reinforces the conclusion
drawn from the aggregate (lata that top executive remuneration has not
kept pace with increases inemployer-companysize. We are able tond
onlyscattered instances in whch the compensation associated with the
highest-paid position in a firm grew as rapidly as even the most sluggish
index of its own expansion.
A second contention offered previOuSl\is also strengthened. Much
was niade of the pOint that an executive'ssalaryaim1 bonuS were not
likely to be x7cr' useful in predicting the aritount c'f his total conipensa-
tion. The low correlation coefficients obtainedbycomparing the aggre-
gate and current remuneratjon rankings for the sample provide clear
support for that hypothesis. The difference between the two criteria is
especiallymarked in connection with rates ci growth over the time
period studied. Those corporations in which executive salaries and
Year or
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bonuses are at a high level are very frequently not among the more
generous in terms of tOtUi Compensation.
There is, on the other hand, considerable evidence that top execu-
tive rewards and employer-company size arc directly related. \Vc find
that the firm's profits are a soniewhat better guide to its pay scale than
are its salesan advantage which has become more marked in recent
years. Because of the possibly significant influence of a series of ex-
ternal factors which could not feasibly be included in the analysis,
however, this conclusion must he regardedas suggestive rather than
definitive. \Vhile the extent to which a firm makes use of deferred and
contingent remuneration for its senior executives also appears to increase
with company size, that increase is fairly mild and can, in part at least,
be explained by certain 'technical" aspects of the compensation process.